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Abstract
In unequal societies, the rich might beneﬁt from shaping economic institutions into their favor.
This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion focusing on one particular institution,
public protection of property rights. If this institution is imperfect, agents have incentives to invest
in private protection of property rights. With economies of scale in private protection, rich agents
have a signiﬁcant advantage: they could expropriate other agents using their private protection
capacities. Ability to maintain private protection system makes the rich natural opponents of full
protection of property rights provided by the state. Such an environment does not allow grass-
roots demand to drive development of new market-friendly institutions (such as public protection of
property rights). The economy as a whole is stuck in a ’bad’ long-run equilibrium with low growth
rate, high inequality, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian ‘oligarchs’ of 1990s, a handful of
politically powerful agents that controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, were the major
motivation for this paper.
1The author is grateful to Simeon Djankov, Do Quy-Toan, Richard Ericson, Jim Leitzel, Leonid
Polishchuk, Victor Polterovich, Gerard Roland, Jacek Rostowski, and Judith Thornton for various
helpful comments. Financial support of EERC-Russia is gratefully acknowledged. An earlier version
of this paper has previously circulated as CEPR Discussion Paper 2300 ”Inequality, Property Rights
Protection, and Economic Growth in Transition Economies: Theory and Russian Evidence”.
11 Introduction
If the state does not protect economic agents from unlawful expropriation, they might do it
themselves. One way to protect one’s property is to maintain a private protection system,
e.g., to hire a security ﬁrm or establish corrupt relationship with a public oﬃcial. An alter-
native way for an agent is to reveal his preferences for more public protection of property
rights through the political process, e.g., by voting for an appropriate candidate in a general
election. In transition and developing economies, the latter option is often suppressed due to
underdevelopment of political institutions. As a result, economic agents are forced to sup-
plement their productive investment with investment in private protection. With economies
of scale in private protection, rich agents have a signiﬁcant advantage when operating in
an environment with incomplete public protection of property rights. Furthermore, their
ability to gain from redistribution due to improper protection of property rights makes them
natural opponents of improvements in public protection.
The economy, where the rich support the regime of incomplete protection of property
rights is an example of what Glaeser et al (2002) call ’subversion of institutions’. Rich agents
can use their wealth and accumulated political power to shape the performance of economic
institutions in their favor. Inequality encourages institutional subversion by the rich, which
in turn leads to increased inequality.2 This paper focuses on dynamics of institutional choice:
the political process determines the level of redistribution of wealth in the society, which in
turn aﬀects political choices of future generations.
One example of rapid institutional change is provided by transition economies, a ”policy
laboratory” for economists (Djankov and Murrel, 2002). The transition experience has
shown that liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, and de-jure privatization in a former
command economy are not suﬃcient conditions for an upturn in economic activity. Among
various explanations of the continued failure of some economies to achieve sustainable growth,
the inability of the state to promote development of ‘good’ economic institutions and the
unexpected stability of ‘bad’ ones is of particular interest. The goal of this paper is to
provide micro- and political foundations for an environment, which does not allow grass-
roots demand for protection of property rights to drive development of new market-friendly
institutions. In particular, we demonstrate that if the rich have enough political power to
2One limit to subversion of the property rights protection institution is that the beneﬁciaries of subversion
still have to protect themselves from each other (Murphy et al, 1993).
2choose the level of public property rights protection, the economy could be locked in a stable
long-run equilibrium with poor public protection of property rights.
The process of public enforcement and regulation of property rights by the state is in-
ﬂuenced by social demands. Agents reveal their preferences over government policy through
v a r i o u sp o l i t i c a lm e c h a n i s m s . I ti sq u i t en a t u r a lt oe x p e c tt h a ti ti st h er i c ha g e n t sw h o
favor full protection of property rights. However, there is substantial evidence that in many
c o u n t r i e sr i c ha g e n t sa r et h em a i nb e n e ﬁciaries of poor protection of property rights, which
allows them to gain from non-productive activities such as rent-seeking or any other redistrib-
utive activity through maintenance of expropriation capacities. In the absence of adequate
public protection of property rights by the state, these rent-oriented structures (in modern
Russia, their leaders are often referred to as ’oligarchs’) might take control of a substantial
share of the national economy. Usually, these structures combine productive activity with
an extensive struggle for the rent-seeking pie. The oligarchs’ success at rent-seeking makes
it unsurprising that they prefer relatively poor protection of property rights. This in turn
forces other economic agents to invest in private protection from expropriation. This may
be the main reason why the Russian state has failed as yet to establish and enforce a clearly
deﬁned system of property rights.
It is by no means assumed that an agent investing in private protection of property rights
invests necessarily in military capacities or such like. Rather, it may be investment in rela-
tional capital, e.g. in establishing corrupt relations with state authorities, costly relational
contracting, or hiring a lawyer. In economic terms, it is a strategy of an economic agent
to increase eﬃciency and predictability in his business relations.3 Since private protection
capacities can be used to obtain various types of rents, we consider investment in private
protections as a particular case of rent-seeking.
In the Tullock (1980) model of rent-seeking and in a great majority of other papers de-
voted to unproductive activities, agents compare their costs and beneﬁts of participating
in rent-seeking. In these models, agents usually have a clear choice of whether or not to
participate in expropriation (or perhaps mix productive and appropriative activities). In
our analysis, we assume that there can be no business without investment in private pro-
tection of property rights (e.g., Alexeev et al 1997; Leitzel, 1997). Then, as stressed in
Shleifer (1997), the agents having private protection have incentives to expropriate resources
3Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman (1998) analyze various types of such strategies of Russian enterprises.
3from others. This makes wide-spread private enforcement of property rights in transition
economies inherently stable.
There are three basic types of negative consequences of poor protection of property rights
for growth. First, the necessity to protect wastes resources as private protection (or any
other kind of rent-seeking) is an unproductive activity. Second, the threat of expropriation
distorts the economic environment and leads to suboptimal paths of capital accumulation
and production. Third, extensive rent-seeking and improper public protection of property
rights are usually associated with substantial income and wealth inequality. The impacts
of inequality and redistribution policies on economic growth are well-studied. Alesina and
Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Benabou (1996) show, both theoretically
and empirically, that inequality is harmful for growth. In these papers, and also in Perotti
(1993), the poor are the beneﬁciaries of redistribution: such redistribution may occur through
progressive taxation of capital income, direct social transfers, extensive regulation, trade and
capital restrictions, etc. Persson and Tabellini (1994) assume that incomplete protection of
property rights (through proportional tax on income) leads to redistribution of wealth from
rich agents to poor. This paper departs from the growth-theory literature in assuming that
the rich are beneﬁciaries of redistribution.4
The negative impact of poor protection of property rights on economic growth has been
long stressed (e.g., Smith, 1776, North, 1981). Using an axiomatic approach, income dis-
tribution in a rent-seeking environment is studied in Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas (1992),
and Skaperdas and Syropuolos (1997). In Grossman and Kim (1995), agents allocate real
resources between appropriative and productive activities in a general equilibrium model.
Spontaneous emergence of property rights have been studied by many authors. Gelb, Hilman,
and Ursprung (1995) noted that in Russia ambiguous property rights provide prizes for rent-
seeking constests. Polishchuk and Savvateev (1997) modeled a one-shot rent-seeking game
to favor rich agents at the expense of poor, and explored static general equilibria properties
of the model. An empirical evidence on unoﬃcial economy in transition is presented and
extensively discussed in Johnson et al (1998). The political economy of partial reforms in
transition economies with the emphasis on the role of powerful rent-seekers in keeping the
4In Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) the rich beneﬁt from redistribution, but face a threat of revolution.
Glaeser et al (2002) analyses the impact of inequality on subversion of capitalist institutions. Do (2002)
focuses on the micromechanism which relates inequality and the extent of regulatory capture.
4economy in an intermediate ineﬀective state is discussed in Hellman (1998).
This paper contributes to the literature studying the interrelationship of inequality and
institutional dynamics. The rich redistribute the wealth away from the poor, which leads
to increased inequality, and thus more possibilities for the rich to gain from redistribution.
Increased inequality may lead to more political demand for better institutions (higher level
of property rights protection). If there is a signiﬁcant wealth bias in the political system,
t h ee c o n o m ym i g h tb es t u c ki nt h el o n g - r u ns t a b l ee q u i l i b r i u m ,w h e r et h e s et w of o r c e s
(increasing inequality due to redistribution and decreasing level of redistribution due to
increased inequality) oﬀset each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, an endogenous growth model
that allows to investigate the interrelationship between rent-seeking (private protection of
property rights), inequality, and growth is introduced. Section 3 analyses the political econ-
omy of property rights protection. Section 4 contains a brief analysis of Russian oligarchs,
who were the main motivating example for this paper, and presents evidence outside of
transition economies. Section 5 concludes.
2 Private Enforcement of Property Rights
In this section, we employ a standard model of endogenous growth to analyze the impact of
incomplete property rights on growth. In an overlapping-generations setup, agents choose
the amount they invest in production and private protection.
2.1 The Setup
There is a continuum [0,1] of heterogeneous overlapping-generations families. Each member
i born at the period t has the utility function
uit =l ncit + ρlndit,
where cit is consumption when young, dit is consumption when old, and ρ is the common
discount factor. This agent i is born endowed with individual-speciﬁc basic level of skills
wit. To simplify the subsequent analysis, it is assumed that the skills are distributed across
agents log-normally:
lnwit ∼ N(m,σ
2),
5and let wt denote the mean (and the aggregate) level of basic skills, where wt = Ewit.
Intergenerational linkages are as follows:
wit+1 = εit+1yit,
where εit+1 is an i.i.d. shock with mean 1 and Va r[lnεit+1]=δ
2,y it is the second-period
income of the member of family i (to be deﬁned later).5 Herein time indices are skipped as
the analysis is focused on members of one generation.
Each agent i has an access to a Cobb-Douglas technology, so that the second-period
income is yi = Ae k
β
i w1−β, where e ki is productive capital after redistribution, A is an exoge-
nously given technological parameter, and w is the economy-wide endowment of basic skills.
The e ki depends not only on the capital investment ki of the agent i, but also on investment of
the agent i into private protection of property rights, and both types of investment of other
agents (see below). There are no credit markets, so agents have no possibility to borrow or
lend to optimize consumption intertemporarily.
In addition to investment in production as described below, each agent may invest in
protection of her property rights. If ki is the capital expenditures of the agent i,a n dhi is
the amount invested in protection, then after redistribution the agent’s i productive capital
is e ki = kihθ
ig. So, for each individual agent production and private protection are strategic
complements. The factor g is deﬁned by the balance condition
Z 1
0
e kidi =
Z 1
0
kih
θ
igdi =
Z 1
0
kidi.
The parameter θ ≥ 0 measures the eﬀectiveness of protection. The case θ =0then cor-
responds to full public protection of property rights. In this case, hi =0 ,g=1 , and no
redistribution actually takes place. If θ>0, then, given the redistribution technology, each
agent invests some positive amount of capital in protection. The balance condition above
shows that this investment is totally wasted. In Tullock (1980) words, there is a negative
sum game.
5Technically, this setup is a familiar growth model (Persson and Tabellini, 1994, Verdier, 1994, Benabou,
1996). It allows to obtain closed-form solutions for maximization problems and thus greatly simplify ex-
position. At the same time, most of qualitative results remain the same in a much broader context, with
an arbitrary non-degenerate distribution of wealth, diﬀerent intra-generational linkages, and not necessarily
multiplicative redistribution mechanism.
6The after-redistribution capital of the agent i is
e ki =
kihθ
i R 1
0 kihθ
idi
Z 1
0
kidi.
This might be interpreted as a special form of a Tullock-type rent-seeking competition. Here
contest inputs hi are weighted by the amount of capital invested, and the whole capital
invested in production forms the rent-seeking pie. This type of redistribution possesses the
basic features of rent-seeking: the relative success is a function of the parties’ respective
resource commitments. Precisely, the agent’s proportionate share of the pie depends pos-
itively on her contest input and negatively on contest inputs of the others. The value of
the prize,
R 1
0 kidi, is endogenous variable as productive and appropriative capital are rival
uses of resources (Hirshleifer, 1988 and Skaperdas, 1995). It is assumed, departing from the
initial Tullock framework, that each agent takes
R 1
0 kihθ
idi as given.
2.2 Property Rights Protection and Growth
Agent i has the following maximization problem:
max
ki,hi
n
ln(wi − ki − hi)+ρln(A(e ki)
βw
1−β)
o
.
A standard procedure gives the solution:
ki = p(θ,β)wi,h i = r(θ,β)wi,
where p(θ,β) and r(θ,β) a r es h a r e so ft h ew e a l t ha g e n ti invests in production and protection,
respectively. Here investment in productive capital rises with improvement of property rights
protection (θ decreases) and productivity, β : ∂
∂θp(θ,β) < 0 and ∂
∂βp(θ,β) > 0. Investment
in expropriation and thus welfare losses rise with θ, i.e. ∂
∂θr(θ,β) > 0. If property rights are
fully secured, θ =0 , then hi =0 , and each agent splits his endowment between consumption
and production.
Those agents that lose in redistribution overconsume in the ﬁrst period, while those who
gain underconsume compared to the case of θ =0 . That is, beside the dead-weight losses,
rent-seeking distorts economic environment.
The second-period income of the agent i is
yi = Ap(θ,β)
βw
(1+θ)β
i
w
¡
Ew
1+θ
i
¢β.
7Summing over all agents, one can get an expression for the growth rate of the aggregate
income:
γ(θ)=l n ( y/w)=l nA + β lnp(θ,β) − β(1 − β)(1 + θ)
2σ2
2
.
With low level of property rights protection (high θ), agents divert more resources from
production to private protection of property rights. Proposition 1 summarizes the above
discussion.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium consumption and investment in production of any agent in-
creases with the level of property rights protection, while equilibrium in investment in private
protection decreases. The growth rate of the economy increases with the level of property
rights protection, and is maximized when property rights are fully secured, θ =0 .
Investing into private protection, agents do not internalize the impact of their actions on
other agents’ decisions: it increase incentives to invest into private protection and diminish
incentives to invest into production. The negative eﬀe c to fp o o rp r o t e c t i o no fp r o p e r t yr i g h t s
on growth comes from two sources: First, the lower is the level of property rights protection
by the state (i.e. the higher is θ), the more resources are devoted to private protection,
a directly unproductive activity. Second, an increase in θ makes budget constraints more
binding; this eﬀect is reﬂected in the second term of the growth equation: in the absence of
asset markets poor underinvest compared to the socially eﬃcient level. Since the rich are
the main beneﬁciaries of redistributive activity, inequality (as represented by σ)h a m p e r s
productive investment and thus growth given any level of property rights protection θ.I ft h e
capital market is perfect with the interest rate equal to the marginal product of productive
capital, then the growth rate is γ(θ)=l n A + β lnp(θ), and there is no second eﬀect of
incomplete protection of property rights as all the agents will invest the same amount of
capital in production. Also, in this case inequality does not aﬀect the growth rate. It is of
course hard to imagine perfect capital markets in the absence of full protection of property
rights. If we instead assume that loans and debts are subject for expropriation in the way
described above, the results will be essentially the same.
2.3 Why Is Manna so Harmful for Growth?
Once a private protection system is maintained, it can be used to contest many types of rents
at the same time. A related politician may help in establishing import tariﬀs in one industry
8and shaping regulation in another. As clearly demonstrated by the East Asia example
(Claessens et al, 2000), oligarchs tend to have well-diversiﬁed businesses. We show that if,
in addition to amending production, investment in private protection can be used to contest
o t h e rr e n t s ,a g e n t sh a v em o r ei n c e n t i v e st oi n v e s ti np r i v a t ep r o t e c t i o n . T h eb i g g e rt h e
rent-seeking pie, the worse the situation is. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) emphasize
that this might make rent-seeking self-generating. For example, when a foreign aid or loan
is obtained, large rent-seekers may maintain their appropriative capacities to struggle for
the pie, and then use the oﬀensive weapons to appropriate resources from others. The same
logic applies to many privatization cases. Further, where rent-seeking is allowed (public
protection of property rights is poor), natural rents constitute an attractive pie. Gazprom,a
natural gas monopoly, pays roughly a quarter of taxes collected by Russian government. In
a developing country such as Mobutu’s Zaire, natural rents may be an even greater as share
of the country’s GDP.
To model the eﬀect of exogenous ﬂow of rents to the economy, assume that, besides
production and expropriation, an agent gains from ’pure’ rent-seeking. The agent’s i share
of the pie depends positively on her own investment in private protection (expropriation) , hi,
and negatively on investment of the other agents. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that the agent’s
i productive capital after redistribution is e ki = kihθ
ig + ∆
hθ
iwi
H , where ∆ is an exogenous
rent-seeking pie, the multiplier g is deﬁn e da sa b o v eb yt h eb a l a n c ec o n d i t i o no nt h ec a p i t a l
market, and H =
R 1
0 hθ
idi, the sum of contest inputs of all agents. Again, the rent-seeking
technology favors rich: this is captured by the agent-speciﬁcc o n s t a n twi.6 For the sake of
simplicity, it is assumed that β =1 , and therefore inequality do not play any role in the
subsequent analysis, and also ρ =1 .7Thus, the agent’s i problem can be written as follows.
max
ki,hi≥0,ki+hi≤wi
n
ln(wi − ki − hi)+l nAe ki
o
.
Solving the problem, one can obtain optimal investment in production and expropriation in
the presence of exogenous rent:
ki = p(θ,∆)wi,h i = r(θ,∆)wi.
6The qualitative results go through without such an assumption. This particular assumption allows to
get a closed-form solution and greatly simpliﬁes comparative statics.
7Main results below hold in a more general setup (e.g., for β,ρ 6=1 ) .
9If the pie, ∆, is large enough, then the endowment, wi, splits between consumption in the
ﬁrst period and investment in expropriation. In what follows, it is assumed that all solutions
are interior. First, we observe that ∂
∂∆p(θ,∆) < 0 and ∂
∂∆r(θ,∆) > 0, i.e. the larger is the
rent-seeking pie, the smaller is investment into production and the larger is the investment
into private protection, which increase agent’s proceeds from rent-seeking.
Proposition 2 The larger is the additional rent-seeking pie, ∆, t h el o w e ri st h eg r o w t hr a t e
γ = γ(θ,∆) of the economy.
3 Political Economy of Redistribution
The next goal is to determine the level of property rights protection preferred by agent i.
Agent i faces the following maximization problem:
max
θ≥0
(
ui(θ)=l n ( 1− (p + r))wi + ρlnAp
βw
(1+θ)β
i
w
¡
Ew
1+θ
i
¢β
)
.
It is easy to prove that any agent i has single-peaked preferences over θ ≥ 0. This assures
that the agent’s i problem has a unique solution, θ
∗
i. T h ep o o r e ri st h ea g e n t ,t h eh i g h e r
level of property rights protection she prefers.8
Proposition 3 (i) If wi ≥ wj, then θ
∗
i ≥ θ
∗
j; that is, the richer the agent, the less secured
property rights she prefers.
(ii) There exists a unique threshold w such that any agent i with wi ≤ w prefers full
protection of property rights, θ
∗
i =0 , while any agent i with wi > w prefers incomplete
protection of property rights, θ
∗
i > 0.
In the recent rent-seeking literature, the level of property rights protection is often en-
dogenous (e.g., Grossman and Kim, 1995). However, the nature of rent-seeking models leaves
little chance that these models may be modiﬁed for the study of growth issues. Perotti (1993),
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Benabou (1996) have endog-
enized tax policy in the political equilibrium of endogenous-growth models. In this section,
8Polishchuk and Savvateev (1997) derive results similar to Proposition 2 in a static model, where pro-
duction and rent-seeking are strategic substitutes. The basic intuition is that production process exhibits
diminishing marginal returns, while returns to rent-seeking are constant.
10the next goal is to endogenize the level of property rights protection, as parametrized by θ, in
an analogous way. It is assumed that the old generation does not participate in the political
process. The most straightforward approach is the use of the median-voter theorem (Grand-
mont, 1978). However, it is doubtful that transition economies satisfy the ’one person, one
vote’ ideal. Rather, anecdotal evidence suggests that the level of property rights protection
(i.e. the actual performance of institutions) is determined by a relatively narrow group of
powerful agents. Let the pivotal voter located at the πth percentile of the wealth (instead of
usual 50th percentile). Then her wealth wπ is deﬁned by F((lnwπ −m)/σ)) = π, where F is
the c.d.f. of a standard normal. One can reformulate this as follows: lnwπ = m+λσ, where
λ = F−1(π). If λ>0, that is π>1
2, the political system is biased toward rich. Historically,
this case corresponds to wealth-restricted franchise. Today, the bias toward rich might be
due to their high lobbying power, imperfect political information, dependence on transfers
from the central government in a transition economy, etc.
To investigate the eﬀects of the wealth bias in the political system, substitute lnwπ =
m + λσ into u0
i(θ)=0for wp ≥ w (λ ≥ σ + 1
σ) and note that θ
∗ =0if λ ≤ σ + 1
σ.
Proposition 4 (i) The more democratic is the society (the lower is the degree of wealth bias
of the pivotal voter, λ), the more secure are property rights in the political equilibrium (the
lower is θ
∗). If λ exceeds some threshold e λ then θ
∗ strictly increases with λ.
(ii) For any pivotal voter, the higher is the productivity of production, (β) or the more
valuable is the future (ρ), the more protection of property rights the pivotal voter prefers.
A straightforward corollary of (i) is that the political equilibrium leads to full public
protection of property rights, θ =0 , if and only if λ does not exceed some threshold.
Increased inequality might reduce (for a wide range of parameters) the expropriation gains
of the rich, and thus makes incomplete protection less attractive. This eﬀect complicates the
investigation of the impact of inequality on growth. While the direct eﬀect of inequality on
growth is negative, an increase in inequality forces the pivotal voter (who, all other things
being equal, becomes poorer than before) to call for more secure property rights and favor
more growth. The eﬀect of a change in inequality on growth can be written down as
dγ
dσ
=
∂γ
∂σ
+
∂γ
∂θ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θ=θ∗
×
∂θ
∗
∂σ
,
where the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side represents the direct eﬀect of inequality on growth
(holding policy, θ, ﬁxed), and the second represents the indirect one. If property rights are
11fully protected, then inequality aﬀects growth exclusively through binding wealth constraints.
In the above analysis, it was assumed that protection of property rights is provided by the
state at zero cost, which is obviously not true. If agents bear costs of public protection, they
prefer even less such protection, and thus the above results become even stronger.
Combining the solution to the maximization problem and intragenerational dynamics of
income within a family gives the law of motion for the family’s income:
lnwit+1 =l nεit+1 +l nA + β lnp +( 1+θt)β lnwi +l nw − β(m(1 + θt)+( 1+θt)
2σ2
t
2
),
where θt is the level of property rights protection chosen in period t. (Recall that θt is chosen
by agents born at the period t.) Assuming Va r[lnεit+1]=δ
2, one can get the autoregressive
process for inequality:
σ
2
t+1 = δ
2 + β
2(1 + θt)
2σ
2
t.
Now a marginal reduction in the level of property rights protection increases not only the
current inequality, but also inequality in all future periods.
Proposition 5 An increase in inequality leads (weakly) to a higher level of protection of
property rights by the state. If there is a strong wealth bias in the political system, then
there are multiple steady-states, with the ’bad’ equilibrium characterized by high inequality
and low level of property rights protection.
In Russia, income inequality has increased dramatically during transition (Kolenikov and
Shorrocks, 2000). This might have increased the demand for public protection of property
rights as discussed above. However, this does not mean that the economy eventually ends up
with full protection. When a political system has a signiﬁcant wealth bias, it may be locked
in a long-run equilibrium with low level protection of public protection of property rights and
low growth rate. As Hellman (1998) notes ”the winners [of reforms] might have an implicit
veto power in the decisions over separate components of reforms, especially those that aﬀect
their existing rent streams”. A negative general equilibrium feedback of inequality on the
level of property rights protection worsens budget constraints, and this eﬀect allows to get
multiple long-run steady states. The assumption of imperfect capital markets is crucial for
this result: if agents are free to lend to and borrow from each other, their investment will
always be socially optimal (given a level of property rights protection).
12The model above allows to get some implications about foreign direct investment to
transition economies, which is widely believed to be an important determinant in succesful
economic development. Brock (1997) found foreign direct investment in Russia (and other
FSU countries) to be much lower than in East European transition economies, not to say
about developed countries. Our analysis sheds some light on this phenomenon: First, invest-
ment in private protection is waste of resources for a foreign investor; second, in terms of the
model above, the overall investment should be very large to allow for redistribution gains.
Last but not least, such an investment (e.g., a bribe to a public oﬃcial) may be considered
illegal in the domestic country of the investor.
3.1 King John vs. Robin Hood
Glaeser et al (2002) call redistribution from poor to rich (our main case in this paper) the
King John redistribution, and redistribution from rich to poor (such as progressive taxation
or social security programs) the Robin Hood redistribution. Considering both types of
redistribution brings some non-trivial insights. In particular, having a rich pivotal voter
would help to oﬀset eﬃciency losses in the case of excessive taxation.
Formally, suppose that there is a progressive tax on capital, with some tax rate τ.Similar
to Benabou (1996), it is assumed that redistribution is as follows. If the pre-tax capital is ki,
then the after-tax capital is e ki = k
1−τ
i mτ, where the multiplier m is deﬁned by the balance
condition: Z 1
0
b kidi =
Z 1
0
k
1−τ
i m
τdi =
Z 1
0
kidi.
As before, incomplete protection of property rights also leads to some redistribution. The
resulting i’s capital stock is e ki with
Z 1
0
e kidi =
Z 1
0
b k
1−τ
i h
θ
igdi =
Z 1
0
b kidi =
Z 1
0
kidi.
For any θ, the growth rate function exhibits usual properties: it is hill-shaped with respect
to τ, the tax rate (see Benabou, 1996 for full detail).
Proposition 6 For any tax rates τ>τ 0, there exists λ such that for any pivotal voter with
λ>λ, the preferred levels of protection of property rights satisfy θ
∗(τ) >θ
∗(τ0).
In words, if the tax rate is too high, then the pivotal voter (who need to be rich enough
to loose from taxation) tries to oﬀset the losses by lowering level of public protection of
13property rights. Polterovich (2001) obtains a similar result assuming that a ﬁxed portion of
the governments tax revenue is contested by economic agents.
This illustrates one particular diﬃculty a government faces: suppose that the tax rate
is below the growth-maximizing tax rate. Now if the pivotal voter determining the level of
property rights protection is rich enough, an increase of taxes would not lead to the desired
increase of the growth rate. The reason is that following an increase in taxes, the level of
property rights protection diminish. The impact through inequality would be fully oﬀset,
and the only remaining (negative) eﬀect would be of increased taxes on incentives to invest
in production. Vice-versa, if the tax rate is above the growth-maximizing rate, decreasing it
would bring additional beneﬁts of more secured property rights.
In most countries, the level of taxation (and, more generally, of redistribution toward
poor) is usually determined by the legislative power (a chamber of representatives, say),
while the level of property rights protection (the degree of subversion of the institution) is
determined endogenously by various political actors. If the level of taxation (i.e. redistrib-
ution of capital toward poor) and the level of property rights protection (i.e. redistribution
toward rich) are determined non-cooperatively by diﬀerent pivotal voters, both of the parties
fail to internalize the resulting losses. Intuitively, this is similar to the case of two authorities
competing over one tax base by independently setting tax rates, a ’tragedy of commons’.
3.2 Economic vs. Institutional Reforms
The next goal is to show that a political base of economic reforms (deﬁned broadly as mea-
sures to increase the tomorrow eﬀectiveness at cost of the today consumption) narrows when
protection of property rights is incomplete. Therefore, privatization, and any other economic
reforms aimed to improve eﬃciency, are much less vulnerable for political opposition if it
follows institutional reforms such as increasing protection of property rights by the state
(Shleifer, 1997, Stiglitz, 2000). The intuition here is that with incomplete protection of
property rights, an agent is not sure that he can successfully transfer a part of his endow-
ment to the second period. An agent (that losses due to re-distribution) is less willing to
sacriﬁce today consumption for an increase in eﬃciency tomorrow.
Formally, we illustrate this idea by presenting an economic reform as a trade-oﬀ between
today’s consumption and enhanced production tomorrow. Suppose that in the ﬁrst-period
agents consider paying a ﬁxed share α of their ﬁrst-period consumption for a next-period
14increase in production eﬃciency (that is, an increase in β) . T h er e f o r mi ss u p p o r t e db y
agents, whose life-time utility increases.
Proposition 7 For large θs, the share of agents supporting reform decreases with the level
of property rights protection. The larger the inequality, the fewer voters support a reform.
4T h e O l i g a r c h s
Aristotle used the word ’oligarchy’ (’power of the few’ in Greek) to describe a political
environment, where the rich rule for the own interests rather than those of the society. In
modern times, this word has applied e.g. to the ruling elite in Imperial Japan (Ramseyer
and Rosenbluth, 1995) and families possessing enormous economic power in Latin America
(Dosal, 1995) and East Asia (Claessens et al, 2000).
Claessens et al (2000) reports that the largest ten families in Indonesia and the Philip-
pines control more than half of the corporate assets (57.7% and 52.5%, respectively). The
concentration of control in the hands of large families is also high in Thailand (46.2%) and
Hong Kong (32.1%), Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore (25%).9 Claessens et al (2000) con-
clude their analysis to say that ”The concentration of corporate control in the hands of
a few families creates powerful incentives and abilities to lobby government agencies and
public oﬃcials for preferential treatment, whether through trade barriers, non-market-based
ﬁnancing, preferential public contracts, or other means. Concentration of control might also
have been a detriment to the evolution of the countries legal systems.”
The rule of oligarchy is often associated with poor protection of property rights. Johnson
et al (2000) argue that the Asian ﬁnancial crisis had more severe eﬀects in countries with
weaker investor protection (as measured by La Porta et al, 1997, 1998). One particular
mean of redistribtion of wealth toward politically valuable agents are capital controls (Rajan
and Zingales, 1998, 2002). Johnson and Mitton (2001) strongly support this view employing
data Malaysian ﬁrms before and after the imposition of capital controls. In particular, they
found that ﬁrms stock price performance in Malaysia is broadly supportive of the view that
capital controls create a screen for cronyism.
9For comparison, in Japan, the largest 15 families controled only 2.1% of GDP in 1996; in USA this
number was 2.9% of GDP in 1998.
15Transition experience provides another telling example. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) use
Russian oligarchs as an illustration to their subversion-of-institutions theory. At the begin-
ning of the Russian transition, it was widely believed that institutional change, in particular
development of the institutions of property rights, is best driven by grass-roots demand.10 In
an ideal world, it is the rich who favor full protection of property rights, since it is they who
have most to lose in any re-distribution process. However, the reality appeared to be quite
diﬀerent. Russian ’oligarchs’, a small group of politically inﬂuential people, that have taken
command of a major share of Russia’s productive assets, is a sound counterexample. Having
accumulated enormous wealth and political power, they eﬀectively blocked any attempts
of the government to improve property rights protection (Polishchuk and Savvateev, 1997).
Stiglitz (2002) says ”Today, in Russia, we do not see demands for strong competition policy
forthcoming from the oligarchs, the new monopolists.”
There is a number of academic papers and books on Russian oligarchs, including Freeland
(2000) and Hoﬀm a n( 2 0 0 2 ) ,w h i c hc o m b i n ead e t a i l e dd e s c r i p t i o no fo l i g a r c h s ’l i v e sw i t h
political analysis. In this section, we collect some stylized facts about Russian oligarchs.
In the early years, rents for redistribution have arisen from various arbitrage opportu-
nities, provided, e.g., by foreign trade liberalization with incomplete price liberalization, or
privatization in the absence of credit markets, which allowed managers to use state-subsidized
credits on short-term money markets (Barnes, 2002, Hellman, 1998). Later, oligarchs have
extensively employed their political inﬂuence during the privatization in 1993-1996,11 and
since then have been investing the capital obtained into extra-market redistribution (Pol-
ishchuk, 1995, Hoﬀman, 2002). For a large stake of the Svyazinvest, a major telecommuni-
cation holding in Russia, the parties employed newspapers, broadcasting programs (with no
exception for shows and news programs), and oﬃcials of various ranks (with no exception
for the Prime-minister, Ministers of Finance, and the Minister for Internal Aﬀairs of Russia,
see Freeland, 2000). During the political war, one of the parties (UNEXIM) announced the
struggle for the establishment of rule of law, including the determination and enforcement
of property rights. Stiglitz (2002) makes a general statement: ”Demands for the rule of law
have come from these oligarchs, who obtained their wealth through behind-the-scene deals
10Aslund (1995) argues that once ”... the fundamental issues [of] the mutual independence of enterprises
from one another (as well as from the state) and their proﬁt orientation [have been addressed], under such
conditions owners will forcefully try to ascertain their property rights”.
11Boyko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995) is the main reference on Russian privatization.
16within the Kremlin, only as they have seen their special inﬂuence on Russia’s rulers wane.”
Before the Svyazinvest aﬀair in 1997, the oligarchs rarely confronted each others as each
of them had its own branch of the economy (e.g., mass-media for Most-bank, natural gas
for Gazprom, international weapon trade for Rossiiskii Kredit, etc) and obtained rents from
it (Freeland, 2000). To some extent, these holdings or ﬁnancial-industrial groups has been
formed within the process of rent-seeking, and thus can be indexed by the rents they receive.
Enterprises which gain from natural or monopoly rents have been of particular interest for
both Moscow ﬁnancial groups and local strong men. Although the groups and their leaders
had initially their business in diﬀerent branches of economy, eventually all of them started to
acquire businesses in unrelated ﬁelds, which have made their peaceful co-existence virtually
impossible.
Among areas of common interest, mass-media have been of particular importance. During
political wars, newspapers and broadcasting programs appeared to be an extremely eﬀective
mean of political inﬂuence and rent-seeking. Accumulation of media-related assets by an
oligarch has lead to increasing political inﬂuence, and thus redistributive power. Sometimes
investment into media has created additional social beneﬁts: e.g., the extensive usage of
broadcasting programs in rent-seeking has dramatically increased the quality of the overall
broadcasting performance.
Most visible conﬂicts have arisen in the enterprises, where ambiguity in property rights
allowed diﬀerent parties to control parts of enterprises’ cash ﬂows. Forms of the struggle
have been various, from an extensive murdering in Krasnoyarskii Aluminievyi Zavod to cum-
bersome legal schemes in Nizhnevartovskneftegaz (although there were also some murders).
T h el a t t e r( N N G )i sap a r to fTymenskaya Neftyanaya Kompania (TNK). The Alpha-group
obtained a 40 percent of shares of TNK at an auction, and then struggled in arbitrage courts
to get a control other NNG for two years. During this time, the management of NNG
succeeded to sell all the property (including licenses) of NNG to newly created ﬁrms. Even-
tually, the Alpha-group took NNG under control, but has to ﬁght for revision of decisions
made by the previous management. This example represents a huge variety of problems
connected with protection of rights of shareholders. Among an enterprises that are engaged
in disputes with its shareholders are oil and electricity companies, including Vostochnaya
Neftyanaya Kompaniya, Achinsky NPZ, AO Irkutskenergo, Sidanko, etc.12 Although protec-
12Freeland (2001) and Hoﬀman (2001) contain a handful of such examples.
17tion to shareholders against arbitrary dilution of ownership was granted by a presidential
decree in August, 1995, many of western investors (especially those with small shares) have
been struggling for recognition of their rights. In many case, it has been necessary to obtain
a controlling interest in a company to get any access to information, which would have been
accessible to any shareholder in a western economy (Berglof and van Thadden, 1999).
At the beginning of Russian transition, there were almost no productive capital in pos-
session of economic agents (although some agents controlled remarkable parts of the state
property). In this case, almost any proﬁt-maximizing behavior included rent-seeking as an
integral part. Agents faced the situation, in which they had to expropriate a part of bud-
getary means or divert a state enterprise’s cash ﬂows to start business, and then to seek
for a budgetary ﬁnanced consumers. Clearly, for Russian rent-seeking, the liberalization of
economic activity prior to the privatization played an important role. It is conceivable that
if the spontaneous privatization of ﬁnancial ﬂows would have been followed with a sponta-
neous privatization of capital assets, the situation with property rights protection at the later
stages of transition might be better. However, the former process (privatization of capital
assets) is necessarily much more observable than the latter (privatization of cash ﬂows), and
thus faces more public resistance. It is an illustration to the general fact that open forms of
phenomena that has previously been hidden are associated with transition, although they
are deﬁnitely not new.
Rent-seeking environment in today’s Russia was to a large extent inherited from the
Soviet economy. Under the former command system, property belonged to the state - in
other words, to everybody in general and no-one in particular. In its late years, the Soviet
economy represented a sort of a quasi-market economy. The operation of this economy
included rent-seeking as an integral and important part. Indeed, the extensive struggle of
expediters of state enterprises for scarce inputs, accompanied by wide-spread corruption,
was a kind of rent-seeking. This activity had often been growth- promoting as it partially
fulﬁlled the duties of the ”invisible hand of market”. At the same time, this way of economic
behavior was harmful for future development as it promoted formation of the behavioral
mores, in which private gain was founded mainly on distribution, and misallocation of the
human capital in the economy. Interestingly, the idea to treat the Soviet economy as a
rent-seeking society (Ekelund and Tollison, 1981), has not been yet recognized by a vast
majority of Russian politicians, political scientists, and economists. Even now, restoration
18of the Soviet-type command system is often considered as measure to reduce or completely
eliminate rent-seeking.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper addresses the issue of inequality and institutions. The channel adopted goes
through directly unproductive, rent-seeking activities. Thus, the model provides insights in
a much broader context than property rights protection: the model accommodates a theory of
institutional choice. Indeed, assume that a social planner can freely choose the institutional
parameter θ, which has the same formal meaning as in the basic model, and that it translates
into a cost c(θ),w h e r ec(θ) is decreasing and convex. We can interpret θ as the rigidity of
the law: civil law would correspond to a low θ and a corresponding high eﬃciency loss,
while common law would correspond to higher levels of θ. The present model will predict
that with high levels of inequality, when redistribution is important, it is optimal to choose
higher levels of θ at the cost of eﬃciency. This modiﬁcation emphasizes the trade-oﬀ between
eﬃciency (which requires high levels of θ) and subversion (which is mitigated when θ is low).
With such an extension, the model provides a theory of institutional choice complimentary
to Glaeser and Shleifer (2001, 2002) and Glaeser et al (2002), and documented by Djankov
et al (2002).
The analysis clarifyes the mechanism underlying the negative inﬂuence of poor protec-
tion of property rights, and the political obstacles to full enforcement of property rights.
Agents with no political power to appropriate privately the fruits of their eﬀorts must de-
vote substantial resources to the protection of their productive capital, and this reduces the
attractiveness of production. In other words, the contestability of property rights diminishes
the incentives to invest and accumulate capital. In theory, it can be easily seen that im-
provements in the ﬁeld of property rights protection (both in the level and the eﬀectiveness),
and a reduction in the level of rent-seeking activity are preconditions for economic growth.
Such improvements may occur only if they are in the self-interest of the majority of those
who determine policy.
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22Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
The growth rate of the aggregate income is given by γ(θ)=l n ( y/w)=l nA +β lns −β(1 −
β)(1+θ)2 σ2
2 . If the level of property rights protection increases (i.e. θ becomes smaller), thens(θ)=
ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ), the share of capital devoted to production, increases, and the term β(1−β)(1 + θ)2 σ2
2
that represents losses due to redistribution and ineﬃcient resource allocation, decreases. Thus, the
growth rate γ(θ) decreases with θ.I f θ =0 , there is no redistribution, and the growth rate is
maximized, γ(0) = lnA + β ln
ρβ
1+ρβ − β(1 − β)σ2
2 .
Inequality enters the last term of the growth rate expression only. If σ
02 is larger, than the
losses increase, since budget constraints (in the absence of complete ﬁnancial markets) of agents
become more binding. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
Interior solutions are guaranteed if ∆ ≤ Aeθσ2 min
©
1
1+θ, 2
θ,1+θ
ª
. The ﬁrst-order conditions
are as follows: 1
wi−ki−hi = A
Aki+∆wi/H and hi = θ(wi − ki − hi). Then
ki =
1
2+θ
µ
1 −
∆(1 + θ)
Aeθσ2
¶
wi = p(θ,∆)wi,h i =
θ
2+θ
(1 +
∆
Aeθσ2)wi = r(θ,∆)wi,
where the balance condition gives gH = eθσ2. Then the growth rate is given by
γ =l n ( y/w)=l nA +l n
1
2+θ
+l n
µ
1 −
∆(1 + θ)
Aeθσ2
¶
.
Clearly, the growth rate γ decreases with ∆, and γ is maximized when ∆ =0 .¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
First, we shall prove that the function
ui(θ)=l n ( 1− (p + r))wi + ρlnAs
βw
(1+θ)β
i
w
¡
Ew
1+θ
i
¢β
is single-peaked for each i. For the maximization problem maxθ≥0 ui(θ), the ﬁrst-order condition
is
1+ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ) + σ2(1 + θ)=l nwi − m. Denote ψ(θ)=
1+ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ) + σ2(1 + θ), the left-hand side.
Note that ψ(0) = 1 + σ2 > 0. Taking the derivative, one gets ψ
0(θ)=σ2 −
(1+ρβ)ρβ
(1+ρβ(1+θ))2. Clearly,
ψ
00(θ) > 0 when θ ≥ 0, and by assumption (σ2 >
ρβ
1+ρβ) ψ
0(0) = σ2 −
ρβ
1+ρβ > 0.T h i s i m p l i e s
that ψ
0(θ) > 0 for all θ ≥ 0, whence ψ(θ) is an increasing function of θ ≥ 0. Therefore, the
ﬁrst-order condition ψ(θ)=l nwi − m h a sa tm o s to n er o o tθ ≥ 0, and u0
i(θ) > 0, if 0 ≤ θ<θ
and u0
i(θ) < 0, if θ<θ .If there are no non-negative roots, i.e ψ(0) ≥ lnwi − m, then u0
i(θ) < 0
for all θ ≥ 0, and therefore, θ
∗
i =0 .
23Now let w be such that lnw =l nw +1+σ2
2 , where w = Ewi = em+σ2
2 .
(i) The possibility to have θ
∗
i = θ
∗
j, when wi 6= wj arises when wi ≤ w a ss h o w ni n( i ) .T os h o w
that if wi > w, then θ
∗
i strictly increases with wi, suppose that wi <w j, and note that θ
∗
i and
θ
∗
j are roots of equations ψ(θ)=l nwi − m and ψ(θ)=l nwj − m, respectively. Then ψ(θ
∗
i) <
ψ(θ
∗
j), since ψ is strictly increasing in θ, and θ
∗
i <θ
∗
j follows.
(ii) If wi ≤ w = e1+m+σ2, then ψ(0) = 1 + σ2 ≥ lnwi − m. Since ψ
0(θ) > 0 for all θ ≥ 0,
θ
∗
i =0a ss h o w ni nt h eP r o o fo fL e m m a1 .I fwi > w, then the equation ψ(θ)=l nwi − m has a
positive root, θ
∗
i.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
The level of property rights protection by the state is determined by the pivotal agent π with
wπ such that lnwπ = m + λσ. Thus, the equilibrium level of protection, θ
∗ = θ
∗
π, satisﬁes
ψ(θ
∗)=l nwπ − m = λσ.
Since ψ is strictly increasing in θ, the lower is λ, the wealth bias, the lower is θ
∗, the equilibrium
level of protection. (Lower θ
∗ corresponds to more protection.) Using Proposition 3, one gets that
if λσ > 1+σ2, then θ
∗ > 0. On the other hand, if λσ ≤ 1+σ2, then θ
∗ =0 . Therefore, an agent
with λ = σ + 1
σ is the wealthiest agent voting for full public protection of property rights. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
If θ
∗ =0 , there is nothing to prove. Thus, it is assumed that θ
∗ > 0. The ﬁrst-order condition
for the level-of-protection maximization problem (maxθ≥0 ui(θ))i sa sf o l l o w s :
1+ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ∗) = λσ −
σ2(1+θ
∗). Note that the left-hand side does not depend on σ. If σ2 ≥ 1
2, then the right-hand side
shifts down and becomes steeper when σ increases. Thus, θ
∗ depends negatively on σ.
Now suppose that σ2 < 1
2, i.e. σ<1
4. Consider some σ<σ 0, both less than 1
4, and let
θ
∗ = θ
∗(σ) and θ
∗0 = θ
∗(σ0), respectively. First, we observe that if θ
∗ ≥ λ
σ+σ0 − 1, then θ
∗0 <θ
∗.
Indeed, multiplying by (σ02−σ2), one can rewrite the former inequality as (σ02−σ2)θ
∗ ≥ λ(σ0−σ)−
(σ02−σ2). Using
1+ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ∗) = λσ−σ2(1+θ
∗), one obtains
1+ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ∗)+σ02θ
∗ ≥ λσ0−σ02(1+θ
∗).
Therefore, the line f(θ)=λσ0 − σ02(1 + θ) lies below the line f(θ)=
1+ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ∗) + σ02θ
∗ − σ02θ
(note that both lines have the same slope). Since
1+ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ) decreases with θ, θ
∗0 <θ
∗.
It remains to prove that θ
∗ = θ
∗(σ) ≥ λ
σ+σ0 −1. It is suﬃcient to show that θ
∗ ≥ λ
2σ −1. From
the ﬁrst-order condition, one gets λσ < 1+σ2(1+θ
∗). It follows that 1+θ
∗ > λ−1
σ . Since σ<1
2,
λ>2σ(λ−σ). Hence, λ
σ > λ
2σ +λ−σ> λ
2σ + 1
σ (the latter inequality follows from λ ≥ σ + 1
σ).
Therefore, we proved that θ
∗ ≥ λ
2σ − 1 as claimed.
24There is a system of two equations that determines steady-states of the model:



σ2 = δ
2 + β
2(1 + θ
∗)2σ2,
1+ρβ
1+ρβ(1+θ∗) = λσ − σ2(1 + θ
∗).
Solving the ﬁrst equation for (1+θ
∗)=
√
σ2−δ2
βσ , we substitute the result into the second equation to
get
1+ρβ
1+
ρ
σ
√
σ2−δ2 = λσ−σ
β
p
σ2 − δ
2,an equation in one variable. Rewrite it as follows:
1+ρβ
1+
ρ
σ
√
σ2−δ2+
σ
β
p
σ2 − δ
2 = λσ. It is straightforward to show that the left-hand side is an increasing concave
function. Then there exists some λ such that for any λ ≥ λ, there are at least two steady-states.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .
In fact, Proposition 5 holds for all θ ≥ 0. T h eh i g h e ri st h et a xr a t e ,t h em o r ee q u a li st h e
after-tax distribution of wealth. Then Proposition 5 could be applied to show that a higher tax
rate leads to a lower level of property rights protection.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .
Suppose that the reform requires each agent i to pay the share of α for the increase in produc-
tivity from β to β
0. Then the agent i supports the reform as long as
β
0 lnp(θ,β
0) − β lnp(θ,β)+( 1+θ)(β
0 − β)ln
wi
1+θ
Ew
1+θ
i
−≥ln(1 − α),
or equivalently
β
0 lnp(θ,β
0) − β lnp(θ,β)
(β
0 − β)(1 + θ)2 +l nwi − (m +( 1+θ)
σ2
2
) ≥
ln(1 − α)
(β
0 − β)(1 + θ)2.
From this equation, one can determine the threshold e w = e w(θ) such that any agent i with wi ≥ e w
supports the reform. For large θ, e w(θ) i sas t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi nθ.¥
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